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ABSTRACT 
Despite their disappointing performance in the recent past, fertilizer subsidies have re-emerged as a tool 
in the agricultural strategies of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The new paradigm for fertilizer 
subsidies calls for use of such mechanisms as vouchers to target benefits to poor smallholders and public–
private partnerships to develop private markets. There is some belief that with these innovations, fertilizer 
subsidy programs will circumvent the deleterious consequences of the programs of the past. However, 
there has been a glaring lack of innovation in how to prevent politics from dominating the allocation of 
subsidy program benefits and exacerbating inefficiencies as was the experience in earlier programs. This 
paper studies how vouchers, which could be used towards the purchase of fertilizer, were distributed 
amongst districts in Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program. We find that politics played a significant 
role in the allocation of vouchers. Higher numbers of vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling 
party had lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that had been lost by a higher 
margin. A district received 2 percent more vouchers for each percentage point by which the ruling party 
had lost the previous presidential election - this amount is both statistically and numerically significant. 
The analysis also shows that district poverty levels, which should have been an important consideration in 
an economic efficiency motivated distribution, were not a statistically significant determinant of districts’ 
voucher allocation. The evidence that vouchers were targeted to areas in which the opposition party 
received strong support is suggestive of the vouchers being used for vote-buying. This finding raises the 
caution that despite innovations in implementing fertilizer subsidies, politically motivated allocation of 
subsidy benefits remains a major potential source of inefficiency.  
Keywords:  Africa, Ghana, fertilizer, subsidies, politics vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen a re-emergence of fertilizer subsidies in the agricultural strategies of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The Malawian government pioneered the return to large-scale subsidies in 
1998 when it started distributing free fertilizer after having discontinued similar programs in the early 
1990s.
1
The historical performance of fertilizer subsidies in the prereform periods in SSA was largely 
disappointing (Morris et al. 2007). The programs had some success in boosting fertilizer use and food 
production while they were in place, but improvements in yields were always limited (Holmén 2005).  
Moreover, evidence from empirical studies on the cost effectiveness of the subsidy programs 
overwhelmingly suggest that the high costs associated with them exceeded their benefits (Morris et al. 
2007).  Administrative weaknesses resulted in pervasive problems of late delivery of fertilizer, delivery of 
inappropriate fertilizer, and delivery of incorrect amounts of fertilizer. Rent-seeking activities and 
political manipulation led to rampant leakages and diversion of fertilizer from intended beneficiaries. The 
inefficient programs also put unsustainably high fiscal burdens on governments. By diverting resources 
from complementary investments in education, road infrastructure, and agricultural research and 
extension, the subsidy programs may have exacerbated the issues of profitability and access that kept 
fertilizer use low to begin with (Donovan 2004).  
 The Nigerian government, which had halted its decades-long involvement in fertilizer 
subsidization, procurement, and distribution in 1997, resumed its major role in the fertilizer sector in 
1999. In 2000, the Zambian government instituted the Food Security Pack program, in which it distributes 
seeds and fertilizer to households. The Tanzanian state returned to subsidizing fertilizer in 2003 and since 
2008 has employed a voucher-based scheme. In 2006, Kenya, which has been touted for successfully 
developing private agricultural input markets through effective implementation of liberalization policies, 
also launched a fertilizer subsidy program. In 2008, the government of Ghana instituted a national 
voucher-based fertilizer subsidy after having been absent from active participation in the sector since 
liberalization in 1991.  
The re-emergence of fertilizer subsidies after widespread liberalization and government exit from 
the sector in SSA has been precipitated by rising food security concerns in recent years. However, there is 
a general renewed enthusiasm for governments to once more play an active role in providing agricultural 
inputs in Africa. At the Africa Fertilizer Summit held in 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, several participants 
expressed the sentiment that fertilizer subsidies were necessary to increase agricultural productivity in 
SSA (Morris et al. 2007). Proponents of fertilizer subsidies include such important donors and 
development partners as the Millennium Villages program and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (Minot and Benson 2009). There is some belief that with a new subsidy approach that includes 
innovations in both program implementation and design, the problems that plagued the programs of the 
past can be avoided. 
The new fertilizer subsidy paradigm eschews the old methods of universal subsidies through 
parastatal monopolies and calls for temporary interventions targeted to poor smallholders and 
implemented with a consciousness for supporting the private fertilizer market. The use of agricultural 
input vouchers has emerged as a mechanism for simultaneously targeting subsidies and developing 
demand in private fertilizer markets as well as encouraging relationships between agricultural input 
dealers and financial institutions (Gregory 2006; Minot and Benson 2009). Public–private partnerships 
have also been promoted to encourage government programs to both exploit private-sector efficiencies 
and avoid distorting the private markets.  
All the countries that have returned to subsidizing fertilizer on a large scale have attempted to 
incorporate one or more of these innovations for improving the efficiency of subsidies. However, the 
tendency of governments has been to adopt only some of the recommendations (e.g., the Malawi program 
uses vouchers but the government typically sidelines the private sector in the procurement and 
                                                       
1 In 2005, the program was reformed from distributing fertilizer to distributing vouchers that could be used toward the 
purchase of packs of seed and fertilizer for maize and tobacco.   2 
distribution of fertilizer), although by design, it is the aggregate use of the innovations, and not a few 
elements of the set, that is expected to avoid the downsides of the past fertilizer subsidy programs.  
Of paramount concern is the glaring absence of innovation to constrain what was a major source 
of concern in past fertilizer subsidy programs: political manipulation. Fertilizer subsidies are prone to 
inefficiencies arising from high costs typically associated with their administration. However, even in the 
lowest administrative cost scenarios, fertilizer subsidies, unless they are accurately correcting for severe 
information and credit market failures, are prone to significant deadweight loss. Politics adds another 
layer to the sources of welfare loss. Holmén (2005, 90) argues that, state agricultural interventions in SSA 
prior to the structural adjustment period were partly “aimed at development and partly at nation-building, 
i.e. the consolidation of power.” Government monopolies, subsidies, and high-default credit programs 
were a way for states to ingratiate themselves with their largely agrarian populations. As such, 
“malpractices, nepotism and diversion of resources from their intended use were often tolerated” (Holmén 
2005, 91). Theories of fiscal federalism (Buchanan, 1950; Samuelson, 1954; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 
1972, 1991, 1997, 1999) show that resource allocation based on political incentives are inefficient.  In all 
likelihood, politics seriously aggravated the inefficiencies of those fertilizer subsidy programs.   
In the present day, the typical country in SSA has at least 60 percent of its workforce engaged in 
agriculture (CIA World Factbook), and fertilizer subsidies still present an alluring appeal to politicians as 
a way of gaining and maintaining political support. At approximately 8 kilograms per hectare, current 
average fertilizer use intensity in SSA is an order of magnitude less than that of other developing regions 
and must rise significantly if the region’s agricultural productivity is to increase (Morris et al. 2007). 
However, direct price subsidies are only one of many alternatives that can be employed to reduce prices 
and improve farmers’ access to fertilizer. For instance, investing in road infrastructure, implementing 
policies that improve the efficiency of ports, eliminating bureaucratic hurdles, and augmenting the 
performance of the financial system would likely lead to significant fertilizer price reductions in countries 
in SSA (Donovan 2004). There is evidence from across SSA that product costs only constitute about 50 
percent of the total retail price of fertilizer with the bulk of  fertilizer prices being constituted by 
distribution and transportation costs, taxes and other regulatory charges, and finance charges 
(Chemonics/IFDC 2007). In comparison, the product cost constitutes about 80 percent of the retail price 
of fertilizer in Thailand where fertilizer use intensity is currently about 96 kilograms per hectare 
(Chemonics/IFDC 2007; Morris et al, 2007). Nevertheless, the potential political gains of fertilizer 
subsidies are often viewed as more pronounced than those of the alternative strategies to increase farmers’ 
access to fertilizer. 
Could the discounted role of political incentives to manipulate subsidy programs erase the 
expected efficiency gains even from programs designed to uphold the gold standard of the “new” subsidy 
paradigm? This paper begins to answer this question using data from Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy 
program. With the international food, energy, and fertilizer price hikes that year there was a sense that a 
government intervention was warranted. The program, as it was designed, incorporated several of the best 
practices for a fertilizer subsidy: it was announced to be temporary, running from July to December 2008; 
there was the prospect for targeting specific beneficiaries as the subsidy was administered through 
vouchers; and a public–private partnership was arranged in which the sourcing of fertilizer was handled 
solely by existing fertilizer importers and distribution was by private retail outlets. However, during the 
actual implementation of the program, there was limited targeting of vouchers. The program was not as 
market friendly as assumed as over 60 percent of fertilizer retailers were precluded from accepting 
vouchers because of the rules requiring vouchers to be redeemed from fertilizer importers (IFPRI/ IFDC 
2009). Due in part to the late commencement of the subsidy program and intermittent fertilizer shortages, 
national average redemption rate of vouchers was only 45 percent. Furthermore, though intended to be 
temporary, the program mushroomed and continued in 2009 even after the food, energy, and fertilizer 
price crises had subsided.  
There are several areas of interest to study in Ghana’s experience with reintroducing fertilizer 
subsidies that can be instructive of the broader outcomes of the “new” fertilizer subsidy programs in other 
SSA countries. We limit the scope of this paper, however, to the role of political incentives in influencing 3 
the distribution of subsidy benefits amongst the districts in the country. Specifically, we analyze whether 
a district’s political characteristics have any bearing on the number of fertilizer vouchers it received.  
In SSA, through a combination of poor recordkeeping, fraudulent activities, and lack of 
administrative capacity, seldom is it possible to determine how subsidy benefits are allocated across 
regions, districts, communities or individuals. For instance, in Malawi’s subsidy programs, the total 
number of vouchers printed and distributed is not known (Dorward et al. 2008; Holden and Lundunka 
2010). Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program presents a unique opportunity to observe the role that 
political influence can play in a fertilizer subsidy even in programs that incorporate the new best practices 
of fertilizer subsidies. In the Ghanaian political context, the district emerges as the natural unit at which to 
observe and discuss the political characteristics of an area. We employ a dataset we assembled containing 
information on the number and types of vouchers received for all but six of Ghana’s 138 administrative 
districts.
2
The subsidy vouchers approximate a transfer from the central government to the district, and as 
such, we look to the literature on tactical redistributive politics to guide our analytical framework. The 
theoretical literature presents opposing theories of which areas politicians will target for higher transfers. 
The “swing voter” models (Lindbeck and Weibull 1993; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998) predict higher 
transfers to districts that do not show clear preference for any particular party. On the other hand, the 
“core supporter” models (Cox and McCubbins 1986) predict that the incumbent party will target more 
resources to areas where it perceives strong support. In the empirical literature, which political 
characteristics are most salient, and in which direction intergovernmental transfers have been affected, are 
also varied. Barkan and Chege (1989), Miguel and Zaidi (2003), and Case (2001) find that governments 
gave preferential treatment to their core supporters and that higher transfers or resources went to areas in 
which the incumbent president’s vote share was higher the previous election. However, there is also 
evidence that politicians engage in targeting swing voters, as in Cole (2009) who finds that Indian state 
governments supplied more subsidized agricultural loans in election years to districts in which they had a 
narrow margin of victory or a loss. Khemani (2007) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) also find 
evidence of politically aligned agencies targeting benefits to swing voters.  
  
In our empirical analysis, the political characteristics of the districts are captured by variables of 
relevance in both the “swing voter” and “core supporter” models. We find that beyond economic and 
demographic considerations, political characteristics are statistically significant determinants of the 
number of vouchers districts received. Higher numbers of vouchers were targeted to districts that the 
ruling party had lost in the previous presidential elections, and more so in the districts that had been lost 
by a higher margin. A district received 2 percent more vouchers for each percentage point by which the 
ruling party had lost the district. This amount is both statistically and numerically significant, implying 66 
percent higher vouchers in a district that the ruling government lost by the average loss margin compared 
with a similar district it had won. The analysis also showed that district poverty levels, which should have 
been an important consideration in an economic efficiency–based distribution, were not a statistically 
significant determinant of districts’ voucher allocation. In fact, district poverty levels were negatively 
correlated with their voucher allocation. Data availability limits the scope of this analysis to political 
considerations in district-level allocation. However, the finding of political considerations influencing the 
voucher allocation at the district level suggests that politics will also influence voucher allocation at the 
individual farmer level.  
This evidence of “vote-buying” activity in Ghana’s 2008 subsidy program suggests that despite 
the innovations in design and implementation of fertilizer subsidies, the new programs have the potential 
to experience at least some of the significant pitfalls of former subsidy programs. The current innovations 
are not enough to make the new fertilizer subsidy programs economically and socially efficient.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a brief 
description of the history of fertilizer subsidies in SSA and discuss the context within which Ghana 
                                                       
2 The district is the second tier of Ghana’s decentralized structure of government. At the time of the subsidy program, Ghana 
contained 138 districts. District boundaries have since been redemarcated, and as of 2010, there were 170 districts in Ghana.  4 
instituted a subsidy program in 2008. In Section 3, we describe the timeline of events and the design of 
the subsidy program, and some observations on how it was actually implemented. In Section 4, we 
present the data used in the analysis. The empirical evidence is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we 
discuss some issues of interpretation of the findings and how they are addressed. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
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2.  CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND  
Fertilizer Subsidies in SSA  
From the late 1960s to the 1980s, many governments in SSA actively intervened in the agricultural sector 
in an effort to increase agricultural productivity and boost food production. Strategies employed were 
varied and included state farms and irrigation programs (Ghana and Nigeria), collectivization (Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, and Tanzania), government-subsidized agricultural input credit programs (Zambia, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya), and output market price controls (Malawi, Ghana, and Uganda) (Holmén 
2005). However, one strategy that was ubiquitous in SSA in this period was high universal subsidies for 
fertilizers. These typically took the form of direct price subsidies through centralized state monopolies for 
procuring and distributing fertilizer, as well as price controls, and pan-territorial fertilizer pricing.  
A common objective of such agricultural programs was national food self-sufficiency partly in an 
effort to ensure food security, but also as a source of national pride (Holmén 2005). In many countries, 
smallholder farmers were therefore the implicit intended beneficiaries of the fertilizer subsidy programs. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread evidence that subsidized fertilizer was typically captured by wealthy 
local elites and politicians. By the nature of the implementation and the lack of recordkeeping of the 
activities under the subsidy programs, much of that evidence is, however, anecdotal. As is summarized by 
Holmén (2005): Friss-Hansen (1994, 13) mentions that in Tanzania, “a politically well-connected village 
could receive more than it demanded [of scarce hybrid maize seed], while other villages received only a 
fragment of their requirement”; Bazaara and Muhereza (2003, 8) describe that in Uganda’s agricultural 
programs, the main beneficiaries were politically connected people and political supporters “who had 
nothing to do with farming”; and Olayide and Idachaba (1987) describe a similar outcome of the 
agricultural interventions in Nigeria where credit and subsidized inputs were funneled to and captured by 
“absentee farmers, retired civil servants, and soldiers.” In Zambia also, “the fertilizer that did make its 
way to farmers often ended up being captured by wealthy farmers who least needed assistance, rather than 
reaching the smallholders who were supposed to benefit” (Morris et al. 2007, 32). 
The agricultural subsidies held immense political appeal because they enabled the construction 
and sustainment of the clientelistic networks on which the state thrived. The political attractiveness of the 
subsidy programs is highlighted by the upheaval typically required for the subsidies to be repealed. Gulati 
and Narayanan (2003) document how political interests have prevented reform in agricultural subsidies in 
India when evidence shows that such reform is necessary from an efficiency perspective. In SSA, despite 
the exacerbating effects of agricultural input subsidies on the already precarious fiscal position of many 
countries, widespread reforms were largely the result of outside donor pressure (Morris et al. 2007). It 
was not until the structural adjustment period starting in the 1980s that many governments relinquished 
their monopolies and pursued reforms to privatize the fertilizer sector.  
Despite the system inefficiencies, the scale-back or complete curtailment of fertilizer subsidy 
programs in the late 1980s and 1990s had evident effects on agriculture in SSA. The fertilizer use in 
several countries, such as Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, either stagnated or declined. 
However, the reduced food production and collapse of fertilizer use after the withdrawal of the subsidies 
does not imply that they should have been maintained. Rather, the evidence suggests that the collapse in 
fertilizer use resulted from partial implementation, or sometimes nonimplementation, of the reforms that 
would have brought in the private sector to play the role that the government had vacated. In many 
countries, despite an official policy of privatization and liberalization to encourage the development of a 
private agricultural input distribution system, reform was riddled with policies that allowed the 
government and connected people to maintain control over the fertilizer sector. Jayne et al. (2003) 
document the following. In Zambia, even though the government relinquished its monopoly on fertilizer 
procurement and distribution, it distorted the market by continuing to distribute large amounts of fertilizer 
through local agents, invariably local political elites, in a very-high-default-rate credit program. Similarly, 
in Ethiopia, after the government limited the monopoly of the parastatal, it continued to play a large role 
by allowing the formation of regional fertilizer companies by persons with political ties that were then 6 
given preferential treatment in access to foreign exchange for fertilizer importation, and also awarded 
contracts to supply fertilizer for government programs. Kenya was a notable exception in that fertilizer 
use increased after the removal of the subsidies; it is also one of the few countries that fully undertook 
reform and implemented legislation and structures to meaningfully support the private sector.  
There is a recognized need for fertilizer use to increase dramatically in Africa. In 2002, fertilizer 
nutrient consumption in SSA was only 8 kilograms/hectare (kg/ha) compared to 101 kg/ha in South Asia, 
where yield rates in cereals are typically two- or threefold those in SSA (Donovan 2004). Although 
fertilizer is not a panacea for low agricultural productivity, “there is little doubt that fertilizer use must 
increase in Africa if the region is to meet its agricultural growth targets, poverty reduction goals and 
environmental sustainability objectives” (Morris et al. 2007, 9). Other than direct price subsidies, 
alternatives do exist to increase fertilizer use on the continent. Significant reductions in fertilizer retail 
prices can result from investments in infrastructure at the port and inland transportation and 
telecommunications networks. Policy changes that improve the functioning of financial markets and the 
broader macro economy are also expected to reduce fertilizer retail prices. High risk in the profitability of 
using fertilizer has been identified as one of the reasons for low adoption (Pender, Nkonya, and Rosegrant 
2004). Interventions that directly address that issue—such as improving and expanding extension 
activities to disseminate appropriate fertilizer recommendations, agricultural research to develop crop 
varieties that are responsive to fertilizer, and investments in complementary technologies like irrigation—
would also likely result in increased demand for fertilizer. Reducing postharvest losses and replacing 
policies and infrastructure that result in rigidities in output markets may also make fertilizer use more 
attractive over time. Such alternatives invariably require lower administrative costs than those related to 
fertilizer subsidies and almost all have positive externalities in the rest of the economy. Indeed, some of 
these alternatives are needed to set the foundation on which fertilizer subsidies can be effective and 
efficient. Drawing from past experience, it is apparent that subsidies that supported Asia’s Green 
Revolution were bolstered by “substantial public investment in education, infrastructure (roads and 
irrigation), and research and extension” (Donovan 2004). 
The renewed enthusiasm for governments to play an active role in providing agricultural inputs in 
Africa is evidenced by the number of countries that have actually reinstituted large-scale subsidy 
programs. Part of the acceptance of fertilizer subsidies despite their deficient past can be explained by the 
many innovations to address the pitfalls of the past programs. Even though no country has successfully 
adopted and implemented all the recommendations of the new fertilizer subsidy paradigm, several have 
made impressive gains, at least in the formulation and design of programs. Fertilizer subsidies of the 21st 
century are typically no longer universal, and almost all pronounce goals of being targeted to poor 
farmers. The subsidy programs in Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Kenya have express goals to 
target subsidies to vulnerable groups, such as female-headed households. Instead of government 
monopolies to distribute fertilizer, subsidy programs now claim to work to develop demand for private 
retailers. Government programs use market-based innovations such as bid-tender systems to source 
fertilizer through the private sector. There has been a proliferation in the use of vouchers (e.g., in Malawi, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Kenya) to be used toward the purchase of fertilizer instead of 
distribution of the actual product. However, as in the prior periods, fertilizer subsidy programs still have 
particular appeal to politicians because of the possibility of manipulating and targeting benefits. Politics 
comes into play in almost every aspect of the decision to provide a subsidy, the design and the 
implementation of a fertilizer subsidy program. Despite the innovations in subsidy implementation, it is 
not clear how the new subsidy programs expect to avoid being overrun by political incentives that 
worsened the inefficiencies in the past fertilizer subsidy programs.  
Situational Context of Ghana’s 2008 Fertilizer Subsidy Program 
Since liberalization reforms in the fertilizer sector in 1991, there had been no large-scale government 
intervention in the fertilizer sector in Ghana until 2008. The decision to implement a national subsidy 7 
program in 2008 was justified as a temporary response to the unusual confluence of events in that year 
that led to simultaneous spikes in global food, energy, and fertilizer prices.  
Within the 12 months after January 2007, the average price of a metric ton of urea, the world’s 
most commonly used nitrogen fertilizer, underwent what was then a sharp rise, increasing from US$272 
to $415.
3 However, in 2008, world fertilizer prices soared.  In April 2008, a ton of urea cost on average 
$452 and then rose to a peak of $815 in August (Figure 1). In Ghana, fertilizer prices rose in concert with 
the global prices. The retail price of nitrogen-phosphorous-potassium (NPK) 15:15:15, the most widely 
used food crop fertilizer in Ghana, increased from 26 Ghana cedis (GH¢) to GH¢ 35 per 50 kg bag, 
between June 2007 and March 2008 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2008).
4 Food prices in the country 
also rose rapidly. Between May 2007 and May 2008, the price of the food staple maize rose by an average 
of 77 percent in the metropolitan areas of Accra and Tamale - during the same period in 2006–2007, 
maize prices had actually fallen by 2.2 percent.
5
Figure 1. Monthly averages of global fertilizer FOB prices, 2000–2009 
 The prices of other staples such as rice and wheat also 
spiked.  
 
Source: International Fertilizer Development Center. 
Notes: FOB = Free on board (average price, with buyer paying freight and insurance to destination port) DAP = diammonium 
phosphate, MOP = muriate of potash. 
Aside from the price crises, 2008 was significant also because presidential and parliamentary 
elections were scheduled for November of that year.
6 Since the return to democratic rule in 1992, two 
parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have dominated 
politics in Ghana.
7
                                                       
3 Free-on-board average price calculated by the Policy, Trade, and Markets Program of the International Fertilizer 
Development Center. Henceforth, all dollars are in U.S. dollars. 
 The ideologies of the two parties are not very distinct however, the NDC, which 
garners its core support from a populist base in rural areas, is perceived to have a more center-left bias. 
4 GH¢1 was approximately equal to US$1 at that time. 
5 Calculated as an average of consumer price index (CPI)–deflated prices in the Accra and Tamale markets as reported by 
the Ghana Food Price Tracking Database produced by Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOFA), and International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI) 
6 In Ghana, a president is elected by national majority rule (50 percent plus one vote) every four years. Members of the 
unicameral legislature, the Parliament of Ghana, are elected concurrently also for four-year terms. 
7 The NDC was founded just before the elections in 1992 by Jerry John Rawlings, the head of the military government at the 
time of democratization. The NPP was also founded around the same time, but it was reconstituted from the United Party that 
was formed in 1957 by a group of African intellectuals who had fought for the creation of Ghana and its independence from the 
British. 8 
Support for the NPP is higher among the urban, educated population, and the NPP is often accused of 
being the party of “elites.” The NDC won the presidency in the 1992 and 1996 elections. In 2000, the 
NPP came into power in an election that saw the first democratic change of regime in the country in 
decades. The NPP government was re-elected with a comfortable margin of 8 percent of the votes over 
the NDC in 2004. However, in 2008 the incumbent NPP was facing what was expected to be a difficult 
re-election bid. A fertilizer subsidy in that year simultaneously addressed the concerns of food security 
and showed farmers that the NPP government had empathy for the rural population, who were largely 
farmers.  
Planting was well under way in the entire country when in May 2008 the government announced 
its intention to subsidize fertilizer as part of its efforts to mitigate the hardship of the population due to 
high food and fuel costs.
8
The 2008 subsidy program included no public tender process for the procurement of subsidized 
fertilizer; nor did the government attempt to directly import fertilizers for use in the program as in 
Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania. In Ghana, the fertilizer sector is completely liberalized and the 
government is not involved in any major way in procurement, distribution, and retailing of fertilizer. All 
inorganic fertilizer in the country is imported ready-for-use by private importers with four private 
companies accounting for essentially 100 percent of the fertilizers on the market.
 The president made the announcement during an hour-long nationally televised 
address. The only reference to a fertilizer subsidy was this: “Government will subsidize the cost of 
fertilizer and ensure effective distribution to farmers to assure a good harvest.” There were no further 
details publicized regarding what would be subsidized, when the subsidy would take effect, or the design 
of the program. When the subsidy program was rolled out in early July 2008, it came as a surprise to most 
of the stakeholders, including district agricultural directors, employees of the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, and farmers (PFAG 2009).  
9
It is noteworthy that the NPP government narrowly lost its re-election bid in 2008. The NPP 
candidate garnered the highest number of votes in the first round but with only 49 percent of the votes, it 
was shy of the majority rule, prompting a runoff vote against the NDC, which had garnered 48 percent of 
the vote (Electoral Commission of Ghana). In the runoff, the NDC defeated the NPP by less than 0.01 
percent of the votes.  
 The government’s 
decision to rely entirely on the private sector to source and distribute subsidized fertilizers may have been 
necessitated by the haste with which the program had to be implemented. Nevertheless, various aspects of 
the program design showed the government’s commitment to supporting the private markets.  
Despite the absence of the stressors that were used to justify the need for a temporary fertilizer 
subsidy for 2008, the subsidy program was expanded and reinstituted in 2009 by the newly elected NDC 
government. This situation sheds light on the lack of political will to withdraw fertilizer subsidies once 
they are in place. 
   
                                                       
8 Agriculture is almost entirely rainfed in Ghana, and therefore planting of virtually all types of annual crops follows the 
rainfall pattern, which is bimodal (March–July and August–November) in the southern areas of the country and unimodal (May–
September) in the northern savannah ecological zones (Kombiok 2008; FAO 2005). 
9 These importers in order of market size are Yara Ghana Ltd. (subsidiary of Yara International ASA) and its partner cocoa 
fertilizer company Wienco Ghana Ltd.; Golden Stork (subsidiary of SCPA Sivex International); Dizengoff Ghana Ltd. 
(subsidiary of Balton CP Ltd.); and Chemico Ltd. 9 
3.  PROGRAM DESIGN AND ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GHANA’S 2008 
FERTILIZER SUBSIDY 
The following description of the program design and implementation is based on the results of fieldwork 
undertaken by the author in seven districts spread over four of the 10 administrative regions of the 
country in October 2008.
 10 During the field visits, interviews were conducted with seven district 
agricultural directors, two extension agents in each district, the regional agricultural director for the Brong 
Ahafo Region, four farmers, and 14 fertilizer retailers.
11
On July 2, 2008, the minister for food and agriculture held a press briefing at which he announced 
a temporary countrywide subsidy on NPK 15:15:15, NPK 23:10:05, sulfate of ammonia, and urea from 
July 4 to December 31, 2008. Farmers were to receive the subsidy in the form of fertilizer-specific and 
region-specific vouchers distributed by agricultural extension agents (AEAs). Ordinarily fertilizer prices 
are set by fertilizer retailers, but as part of the subsidy program, the government and the private fertilizer 
importers negotiated the price per 50 kg bag in each district capital.
 
12
The subsidy level was chosen with two objectives: first to return the price farmers paid for 
fertilizer to the levels prevailing in July 2007, and second to create pan-territorial pricing for fertilizer. 
There were no specifically articulated goals of the subsidy program, and it did not call for targeting of the 
vouchers to farmers based on their income or the crop they cultivated. However, the types of fertilizers 
subsidized were generally not for use on cocoa, the main cash crop in the country. NPK 15:15:15 was 
already widely used in the country as a basal dressing fertilizer, whereas urea and sulfate of ammonia 
were the typical top dressing fertilizers. On the other hand, NPK 23:10:05, a special maize formulation 
and a product of Yara, was largely unknown to farmers before the subsidy program.  
 The vouchers had face values of 
approximately 50 percent of the negotiated prices. A voucher could be used toward the purchase of the 
relevant fertilizer from any retailer in the region of issue that was willing to accept it.
 The retailer then 
passed on the redeemed vouchers to an importer (in practice, one with whom it was contracted). The 
importer in turn was to transmit an invoice for the value of vouchers to the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture and receive payment within a week. 
The regional agricultural directors convened meetings with their district agricultural directors to 
inform them about the details of the subsidy program at about the same time that the program was 
announced to the public.
13 The district agricultural directors in turn convened meetings with the AEAs 
either just before or on July 4 to inform them about their roles in the subsidy scheme. AEAs were to 
distribute vouchers to farmers within their operational areas.
14
Figure 2 shows a timeline of major events in the fertilizer subsidy program. During the peak 
fertilizer application periods of April, May, and June, subsidized fertilizer was not available.  It was on 
June 30, 2008, that the first batch of vouchers was delivered to the headquarters of the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MOFA) in Accra from the contracted printer.  
 After July 2, the supplemental cash amount 
to be used with vouchers, that is, the price per 50 kg bag for fertilizer purchased with a voucher, was 
announced widely on radio and television. It was mainly through those announcements that farmers 
learned that a subsidy program had begun and the details of the program.  
                                                       
10 At the time of the subsidy, there were 138 administrative districts. 
11 Districts visited were Suhum Kraboa Coaltar and Juaben in the Eastern Region; Asante Akim North and Kumasi 
Metropolitan Area in the Ashanti Region; Sunyani District in the Brong Ahafo Region; and Tamale Metropolitan Area and Tolon 
Kumbugu in the Northern Region. 
12 The negotiated prices were generally higher than the market prices that had prevailed just before the subsidy program by 
an average of GH¢ 10.00 and as much as GH¢ 25.00 per bag (Banful 2009). 
13 Based on personal conversation with the regional agricultural director of the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana, October 23, 
2008. 
14 The Ministry of Food and Agriculture guidelines state that a district should be divided into 32 operational areas each 
served by one AEA. However, most districts do not have enough agents on staff to allow that many operational areas. The 
boundaries of operational areas are typically not clearly demarcated and are not easily recognized. 10 
Figure 2. Major events in Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program 
 
Source: Banful (2009). 
Vouchers were then sent from MOFA’s Accra office to the regional agricultural offices where the 
regional voucher allocations was distributed among the districts within the region. The regional offices 
received the total regional allocation in batches, spread out over two to six different dates, over the period 
from the June 30, 2008, to mid-October 2008. The first consignment of vouchers to the region received on 
or shortly after June 30, 2008, was typically distributed in the following way. Regional agricultural 
directors convened meetings of all district agricultural directors in their jurisdiction. At those meetings, 
through some combination of bargaining and discussion, the vouchers for the region were shared between 
districts. It appears that this procedure occurred only for the first batch of vouchers and that districts 
subsequently received vouchers by making requests to the regional agricultural office. Those requests 
were not necessarily honored, and the number and types of vouchers districts received were typically 
different from what they had requested.  
The planned total number of vouchers for the duration of the program was 600,000 covering 
30,000 metric tons of fertilizer, with the total value of subsidy offered amounting to about $15 million. 
However, the number of vouchers printed was actually 1,140,850. The distribution of the first 601,400 
vouchers printed roughly followed a predetermined distribution pattern of 15 percent each to the Northern 
and Brong Ahafo regions; 13 percent to the Ashanti Region; 9 percent each to the Upper East, Upper 
West, Central, Eastern, and Volta regions; and 6 percent each to the Western and Greater Accra regions.
15
                                                       
15 Planned distribution sourced from memo to regional agricultural directors from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
June 2008. Actual distribution from Banful (2009). 
 
However, there was subsequent printing of vouchers for all regions except for the Western, Central, and 
Greater Accra regions. The distribution of the extra vouchers by fertilizer type and region of redemption 
did not follow any clear pattern.  11 
The proportion of the vouchers issued to the regions that were actually used to purchase fertilizer 
under the subsidy program was below 50 percent nationally but varied significantly by region. Anecdotal 
evidence provides two main reasons why voucher redemption rate was low, and also why it varied across 
the country.  First, the program started too late for some farmers to take advantage, either because they 
had already bought fertilizer, or, the ideal fertilizer application time for their crops had passed.  Second, 
there were intermittent fertilizer shortages throughout the country some of which likely coincided with the 
times farmers would have desired to utilize their fertilizer vouchers.  Banful (2009) documents that 67 
percent of vouchers issued to Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions were redeemed.  On the other 
hand, only 10 percent of the vouchers issued to Western and Central regions were redeemed for fertilizer.  
Similarly, only 36 percent of the vouchers issued to Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern, Greater Accra and 
Volta regions were redeemed.  While, there is no district level data available on voucher redemption rates, 
the variation in redemption rates calculated at regional level indicates that district level redemption rates 
likely varied as well.   
   12 
4.  DATA  
The empirical analysis uses district-level data consisting of demographics, number and type of vouchers 
received under the 2008 fertilizer subsidy program, and election results.  
The data relating to the subsidy program were from a primary data collection effort by the author. 
Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture has decentralized regional offices in each of the 10 
administrative regions of the country, and district offices in each of the districts of the country. In May 
2009, a questionnaire was dispatched to the district agricultural directors in each district office requesting 
information about the number and type of vouchers received, the dates of delivery, and the number and 
type of vouchers left over as of December 31, 2008.
 The district agricultural office staff that provided the 
requested data was also asked to fill out an open-ended comment card. Each of the 10 regional 
agricultural offices was also asked to provide these same data disaggregated at the district level. This 
attempt to collect the same information from two different sources was to compensate for possible lapses 
in recordkeeping at either of the sources. In most regions, the district agricultural offices provided the 
requested data except for the dates of delivery. In combination with the data obtained from all 10 regional 
agricultural officers, the resulting dataset was complete for all but six of 138 districts.
16 Based on the 
records of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the total number of vouchers printed and distributed was 
1,140,850.
17
Election results for the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections were obtained from the 
headquarters of the Ghana Electoral Commission in Accra. The variables in the dataset include number of 
registered voters, voter turnout, number of valid votes, political party of each presidential and 
parliamentary candidate, and number of votes each candidate received. The unit of observation for all of 
these election data is the constituency level, but the data were further aggregated to the district level. A 
party is defined as winning a district in the presidential or parliamentary election if it captures a majority 
of the votes there. It has almost always been the case that the candidate from the NPP or the NDC wins in 
both the presidential and the parliamentary election. The vote shares of political parties in the 
parliamentary election, which are reported at the constituency level, are virtually identical to the 
presidential election results. The analysis therefore focused on presidential election results only. The vote 
margin between the two dominant parties, the NDC and the NPP, in the presidential election was used as 
a proxy for electoral competition in the district.  
 Based on the data collection from the district and regional agricultural offices, the total 
number of vouchers summed to 964,950. This total excludes the number of vouchers received by the six 
districts on which we have no data. Nevertheless, an estimate of the number of vouchers that each of the 
districts for which we have no data would have received (based on statistics from other districts in the 
region) yields a total national number of vouchers that agrees closely with the number expected.  
Demographic data such as district population, district area, and percentage of labor force engaged 
in agriculture were obtained from the 2000 census results published by the Ghana Statistical Services. 
Measures of poverty used were district-level poverty headcount, poverty gap, and poverty severity 
developed by Harold Coulombe based on the 2000 census (Coulombe 2005). These demographic and 
poverty data were disaggregated based on the 110 districts that existed at the time of the census. In the 
instances where a district had since been split, the data values of the district from which the new districts 
had been formed were assigned to the new districts.  
The area of maize cropped in a district, obtained from the Statistics, Research, and Information 
Directorate of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, is used as a measure of district demand for fertilizer. 
In Ghana, maize is produced and consumed in all acroecological zones and is the food crop that has 
historically been cultivated on the largest area of land (FAO 2005; Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
                                                       
16 Data were missing for Bole, Karaga, Nanumba North, and Nanumba South districts in the Northern Region and Amansie 
West and Builsa in the Ashanti and Upper East regions, respectively. 
17 The author interviewed the accountant in charge of managing the voucher program and the stock keeper in charge of 
receiving and disbursing vouchers at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Additional data were collected until November 17, 
2008, by which time the last disbursements had been made. 13 
2009). Additionally, data from an IFPRI/International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) census of 
agricultural input dealers in Ghana confirm the dominant position of maize among crops to which 
fertilizer is applied.
18
A summary of the data used in the analysis is shown in Table 1. 
 The area of maize cultivated in a district is therefore a reasonable proxy for the 
demand for the types of fertilizers subsidized.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable  Number of 
observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Min.  Max. 
Number of vouchers
 a  132  7,308  7,093  150  49,550 
District population in 2000
b   138  137,044  169,386  42,721  1,658,937 
Percentage of district labor force 
engaged in agriculture in 2000
b  138  61.91  18.62  3.7  87.2 
Farmers*
b  138  68,351  25,700  12,637  191,944 
Vote percentage of ruling 
government, 2004 elections
c  138  48.29  20.17  4.24  88.20 
Ruling government won district in 
2004 elections
c  138  0.55  0.50  0  1 
District area in square kilometers 
(km
2)
b  138  1,719  1,792  150  12,955 
Doctors per district in 2000
b  138  5.55  9.13  1  89 
Teachers per district in 2000
b  138  600  597.0  54  5,265 
Nurses per district in 2000
b  138  41.83  91.84  2  959 
Enrollment per teacher in district in 
2000
b  138  44.37  19.48  21.54  110.9 
Poverty headcount index
e  138  0.48  0.18  0.05  138 
Poverty gap index
e  138  0.19  0.11  0.01  138 
Poverty severity index
e  138  0.10  0.07  0.00  138 
Maize area cultivated (km
2) in 
2007
d  138  57.25  58.94  0.70  319.45 
Sources:  
a Author’s survey; 
b 2000 Population and Housing Census of Ghana. Ghana Statistical Services; 
c Electoral 
Commission of Ghana; 
dStatistics, Research, and Information Directorate of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture; 
e Coulombe 
(2005).  
Note: All statistics are reported at the district level. 
* Number of farmers per district is estimated as the product of the district population and the percentage of the labor engaged in 
agriculture. No nationally comprehensive district level farmer population data was available. 
                                                       
18 Vegetables such as tomato, garden egg, pepper, onion, and okro are fed with fertilizers at about the same rate as maize, 
but the area of each of these crops cultivated is miniscule compared with the acreage of maize. 14 
5.  DID POLITICS PLAY ANY ROLE IN THE ALLOCATION OF THE VOUCHERS? 
Basic Statistics of Voucher Allocation 
Table 2 shows data on vouchers received by districts in each of the 10 administrative regions of Ghana 
and a ranking of the regions by total number of vouchers to the region, average number of vouchers per 
district and average number of vouchers available per 1,000 farmers in a district. There was significant 
regional variation in the number of vouchers a district received. The number of vouchers per district was 
generally higher in the regions in the northern part of the country. This amount ranged from an average of 
about 15,000 vouchers per district in the Northern Region to an average of less than 1,000 vouchers per 
district in the Western Region.  
Table 2. Regional voucher allocation 
Regions ranked by:  Regions ranked by:  Regions ranked by: 
Total number of vouchers to 
region 
Average number of vouchers per 
district 
Average number of vouchers 
available per 1,000 farmers 
Northern*  206,950  Northern  14,782  Northern  194 
Brong Ahafo  193,550  Upper East  11,293  Brong Ahafo  172 
Ashanti*  157,500  Brong Ahafo  10,187  Greater Accra  163 
Eastern  105,750  Ashanti  7,875  Upper West  147 
Upper East*  79,050  Upper West  6,831  Upper East  142 
Volta  70,700  Eastern  6,221  Ashanti  105 
Upper West  54,650  Greater Accra  5,650  Eastern  97 
Central  51,950  Volta  4,713  Volta  89 
Greater Accra  33,900  Central  3,996  Central  72 
Western  10,650  Western  819  Western  10 
Source: Author’s survey. 
Note: Calculations do not include data for four districts in the Northern Region, two in the Ashanti Region, and one in the Upper 
East Region.  
* Total does not include data for some districts in the region. 
The approximate number of vouchers available per 1,000 farmers ranged from an average of 200 
in districts in the Northern Region to an average of about 10 in districts in the Western Region. Districts 
in the northern regions of the country generally had a higher number of vouchers available per farmer. 
The exception is the Greater Accra Region, which is located in the southernmost part of the country but 
ranks third in terms of the highest average number of vouchers available per 1,000 farmers.  
The composition of the total voucher allocation is of interest as the vouchers were fertilizer-
specific. The late start of the subsidy program means that discriminating farmers would have preferred the 
“top dressing” fertilizers like sulfate of ammonia and urea.
19
                                                       
19 Apart from urea, which has a recommendation of 50 kg per acre, the recommended application rate of all the other types 
of subsidized fertilizer is 100 kg per acre. However, urea is typically less preferred among farmers because of the extra labor 
needed to apply it by burying (Kombiok 2008).  
 Figure 3 shows the proportions of the 
various types of vouchers that made up the voucher allocation for districts within each of Ghana’s 10 
administrative regions. The data show again that the composition of the vouchers that districts received 
also varied depending on the region of location. With the exception of districts in the Northern Region, 
about half of the vouchers districts received were for NPK 15:15:15. In the Northern Region, the majority 
of the vouchers districts received were for sulfate of ammonia, which would have been highly desirable 
vouchers.  15 
Figure 3. Average composition of fertilizer vouchers received by districts 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
At the regional level of disaggregation, there is too much heterogeneity to determine how 
political, demographic, agroecological, and agricultural characteristics influenced the distribution. There 
is clearly a pattern whereby regions in the northern parts of the country received higher numbers of 
vouchers than those nearer the south. However, even within regions, the amount districts received varied 
widely.  
What Were the Determinants of Voucher Allocations?  
Given that vouchers are a form of income support, the distribution of vouchers to districts under a subsidy 
program is essentially a form of intergovernmental transfer. The district allocation of vouchers was in 
some sense a measure of the per capita benefits that the central government sought to transfer to the 
district under the subsidy program. Like any other benefits that can be targeted to specific groups or areas, 
the vouchers can be tactically distributed to achieve political goals rather than those that maximize 
economic or welfare outcomes.
20
We focus on the district as the main level of analysis for several reasons but primarily because it 
is the lowest-functioning tier of the decentralized local government structure of Ghana.  It is also the most 
important unit in the political discourse of the country. Much of government activities are concentrated at 
this level through local government structures called district assemblies.
 The empirical strategy we employ to test whether political 
considerations played a role in voucher allocations is to determine whether a district’s political 
characteristics are statistically significant determinants of the number of vouchers it received.  
21
                                                       
20 Politically motivated tactical distribution of intergovernmental transfers is typically aimed at maximizing the re-election 
prospects of the incumbent government. 
 The district is small enough for 
there to be considerable homogeneity in the geographic and demographic characteristics of the area it 
covers. Furthermore, the district is often the lowest level of disaggregation at which demographic, 
economic, agricultural, and other data are reported. 
21 District assemblies are formally nonpartisan, but they are always headed by a political appointee of the ruling president. 
Thirty percent of the assembly comprises appointed members who are also from the political party of the ruling president. The 
rest of the membership is elected based officially on nonpartisan platforms, but informal party activity plays a major role in the 
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The announcement of the subsidy program emphasized its role to support food-crop producers 
under the burden of increasing fertilizer prices to increase their agricultural productivity.  The efficiency 
of the program would be increased if only demographic, economic, and agricultural activity 
characteristics of the district are determinants of voucher allocation rather than any political 
considerations. Under economic efficiency distribution criteria, voucher allocation should be higher to 
districts with more food-crop agricultural activity and to those with poorer populations among which a 
subsidy is likely to induce incremental fertilizer use. An econometric specification that would capture the 
salient determinants of voucher allocation under a purely efficiency-motivated distribution is given by  
  yi = α0 + α1AREAi + α2FARMRSi + α3POVRTYi + α4ECLGYi + α4Zi + ui ,  (1) 
where yi is the total number of vouchers received by the district, AREA is a proxy for the agricultural 
activity in the district and is measured by either the total area of the district in square kilometers or the 
area of maize that was cultivated in the district in 2007, FARMRS is the number of farmers in the district, 
POVRTY is a measure for district-level poverty, ECLGY captures district agroecology, and Zi is a vector 
of region-specific dummies. Measures of district agroecology are important because even though the 
subsidy program started after the optimal fertilizer application periods in all parts of the country, the 
lateness was more pronounced among districts in the southern parts. A purely economic efficiency basis 
of distribution may have resulted in vouchers being targeted to districts in the ecological zones in the 
north. In our regression estimations, ECLGY is captured by the latitude of the centroid of the district. 
District poverty is measured by the poverty headcount ratio, the poverty gap index, or the poverty severity 
index.  The region dummy variables are included to capture the influence of a district’s location on the 
number of vouchers it receives.   They serve as another control for the variation in agroecology and also 
capture district characteristics correlated with the region of location that are not explicitly controlled for 
but which could plausibly be determinants in the distribution of vouchers based on economic and welfare 
efficiency considerations (for example the variety of livelihood opportunities and credit facilities 
available in the district). 
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the regression specification in equation 1. In panel A, 
the extent of agricultural activity in the district is measured by the number of farmers in the district and 
the area of maize cropped in the previous planting season. The voucher allocation of the district is 
increasing in the number of farmers as well as the area of maize cropped. The coefficient estimate 
suggests that the voucher allocation of the district increases by 6 percent for every additional 10,000 
farmers in the district and 0.3 percent for every square kilometer of maize cultivated in the district. The 
positive coefficients on measures of agricultural activity in the districts suggest that the voucher allocation 
was at least in part influenced by economic considerations. However, the regression results show that a 
district’s poverty does not influence its voucher allocation in the way that would be expected under a 
purely efficiency-based distribution pattern. The negative coefficients on measures of district poverty 
suggest that less-poor districts received more vouchers. Higher voucher allocations to less-poor districts 
increases the subsidy benefits that displace unsubsidized purchases of fertilizer that would have been 
made thereby reducing the efficiency of the subsidy program.  The coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, but they show that, at best, a district’s poverty was not a primary consideration in its 
voucher allocation. 
In panel B of Table 3, the area of maize cropped is replaced by the total land area of the district as 
a measure for agricultural productivity. In these regressions as well, the district allocation is increasing in 
the number of farmers. However, the number of vouchers a district received is decreasing in the total land 
area versus increasing as would be expected under a distribution pattern based solely on efficiency 
considerations. However, the coefficients are only marginally significant, and it is possible that total land 
area is not a suitable proxy for area of food-crop cultivation in a district. As in panel A, the positive 
coefficients on district latitude show that districts in more northern ecological zones received higher 
voucher allocation than similar districts in southern ecological zones. 
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Table 3. Economic determinants of the number of vouchers transferred to each district 
Panel A  Dependent variable: Ln (vouchers received) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Farmers (10,000s)  0.061  0.061  0.064*  0.064*  0.065*  0.065* 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Maize cropped (km
2)  3.7e-3**  3.8e-3**  3.6e-3**  3.8e-3**  3.6e-3**  3.8e-3** 
  (1.7E-03)  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-03)  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-03)  (1.7E-03) 
Poverty headcount ratio  -0.01  0.07         
  (0.10)  (0.96)         
Poverty gap index      -1.06  -0.76     
      (1.81)  (1. 70)     
Poverty severity index          -2.13  -1.57 
          (2.72)  (2.53) 
Latitude  0.06    0.10    0.12   
  (0.19)    (0.20)    (0.20)   
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  7.01***  7.67***  6.94***  7.73***  6.84***  7.72*** 
  (1.07)  (0.47)  (1.07)  (0.44)  (1.08)  (0.43)2 
R-squared  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47 
Panel B  Dependent variable: Ln (vouchers received) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Farmers (10,000s)  0.092**  0.092**  0.098**  0.100**  0.100**  0.100** 
  0.039  (0.039)  0.039  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Total area (km
2)  -9.9E-5  -9.3E-5  -1.1E-4*  -1.0E-4  -1.2e-4*  -1.06E-04 
  6.1E-05  (6.1E-5)  (6.2E-05)  (6.2E-5)  (6.28E-05)  (6.18E-05) 
Poverty headcount ratio  -0.28  -0.08         
  (1.01)  (0.97)         
Poverty gap index      -2.04  -1.32     
      (1.86)  (1.74)     
Poverty severity index          -3.94  -2.61 
          (2.83)  (2.62) 
Latitude  0.155    0.218    0.248   
  (0.195)    (0.201)    (0.202)   
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  6.83***  7.66***  6.53***  7.73***  6.337***  7.710*** 
  (1.15)  (0.48)  (1.18)  (0.44)  (1.20)  (0.44) 
R-squared  0.46  0.46  0.47  0.46  0.47  132 
Source:  Author. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. There were 132 observations in all regressions. 
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
As has been argued, the pattern of voucher allocation is likely to have been influenced by district 
political characteristics. To test this, we estimate an augmented version of equation 1 in which we include 
political characteristics of the districts. The district political characteristics that are expected to matter are 
informed by theories of redistributive politics. The “core supporter” models of Cox and McCubbins 
(1986) predict that politicians are like risk-averse investors—they will give fewer transfers (vouchers) to 
districts where opposition to their party is strong, somewhat more to districts that have not shown a clear 
preference for one party or the other, and the most to districts that clearly support them. Therefore, if the 18 
voucher allocation was manipulated by the ruling party to target its core supporters, we would expect 
district voucher allocation to be increasing in measures of ruling party support. We use as a measure of 
the political support for the ruling party the vote share or the dummy variable for whether it won the 
district in the last presidential election. This leads to a specification given by 
  yi = β0 + β1AREAi + β2FARMRSi + β3POVRTYi + β4ECLGYi + β5INCBsuppi + β6Zi + ui ,  (2) 
where INCBsupp is a measure of support for the incumbent party in the district given by the vote share of 
the ruling party or the dummy variable for whether it won the district in the last presidential election. 
AREA, FARMRS, POVRTY, ECLGY and Zi  are defined as in equation 1. 
A contrasting set of theoretical models (Lindbeck and Weibull 1993; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 
1998) predicts that the district political characteristic that matters is the prevalence of “swing voters,” 
those voters who can be easily swayed (by transfers) to support one party or the other. That framework 
implies that politicians will target benefits to districts where there is high electoral competition illustrated 
by a lower margin between the vote shares of the two political parties. We consider the vote margin 
between the two parties in the last presidential election and vote margin interacted with the identity of the 
winning political party as salient political characteristics of the district. A positive coefficient on the vote 
margin in districts that the ruling party has won also suggests targeting of vouchers to core supporters of 
the ruling party. However, a positive coefficient on the vote margin in a district that the ruling party lost 
suggests that vouchers were used for vote-buying, that is, an attempt to curry favor with those who had 
voted for the opposition party. The specification to test this hypothesis is given by equation 3: 
yi = γ0 + γ1AREAi + γ2FARMRSi + γ3POVRTYi + γ4ECLGYi + γ5iINCBwinner + 
γ6VTMARGi + γ7INCBwinneri * VTMARGi + γ8Zi + ui ,  (3) 
where INCBwinner is a dummy for whether the incumbent party won the district in the previous 
presidential election and VTMARG is the margin by which the presidential election in the district was 
won. AREA, FARMRS, POVRTY, ECLGY and Zi  are defined as in equation 1. 
Table 4 shows the results of the regressions based on equations 2 and 3. The regression results 
were similar using all three different measures of district poverty, and therefore we show only the results 
from the estimation using the poverty severity index. The regressions show strong evidence that politics 
of the district was a consideration in the allocation of vouchers. 
The coefficients on measures of support for the ruling government in columns 1 through 4 present 
strong evidence against the hypothesis that the incumbent government targeted its supporters for higher 
vouchers. The coefficients instead suggest that areas that supported the ruling government were 
disadvantaged. In the regressions in columns 5 and 6, which include the vote margin as the main political 
characteristic of the district, the positive coefficients on vote margin are strongly statistically significant 
and in contrast to the negative coefficients that are expected if vouchers were targeted to areas with high 
electoral competition. In columns 7 and 8, the vote margin interacted with the identity of the winning 
party, provides more insights into how political considerations played a role. The coefficients on vote 
margin in those columns show that vouchers were targeted to districts with higher vote margins but only 
those districts in which the ruling government had lost. The magnitude of the estimate is 2 percent more 
vouchers for each percentage point of the votes by which the ruling party had lost the district. The vote 
margin in districts where the ruling party had won did not influence their voucher allocation. 
The evidence in Table 4 suggests that vouchers were used in an attempt at vote-buying. The 
advantage that opposition-supporting districts had was not only statistically significant but also 
numerically significant. The average difference between the vote share of the incumbent and that of the 
opposition party in districts that the incumbent had lost was 33 percentage points. A district that the 
opposition party had won with this vote margin would have received 66 percent higher vouchers than a 
similar district that the ruling party had won.19 
Table 4. Political and economic determinants of number of vouchers received 
  Dependent variable: Ln (vouchers received) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Ruling party winner  -0.331  -0.343          0.312  0.104 
  (0.252)  (0.239)          (0.383)  (0.347) 
Ruling party vote share 
    -0.0137*  -0.0140*         
    (0.0080)  (0.0079)         
Vote margin          0.015***  0.014**  0.0261***  0.0218*** 
          (0.006  (0.006)  (0.0089)  (0.0083) 
Ruling party winner * 
Vote margin 
            -0.0214*  -0.0171 
            (0.0121)  (0.0116) 
Farmers ( 10000s)  0.064*  0.064*  0.069*  0.070*  0.060  0.060  0.063*  0.063* 
  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Maize area (km
2)  3.4e-5**  3. 5e-3**  3.0e-5*  3.1e-3*  4.2e-5**  4.4e-3***  3.5e-3**  3.8e-3** 
  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-3)  (1.E-3)  1.7E-3  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-3)  (1.7E-3) 
Poverty severity index  -1.94  -1.80  -2.40  -2.03  -2.35  -1.27  -2.61  -1.40 
  (2.72)  (2.53)  (2.70)  (2.53)  (2.65)  (2.48)  (2.65)  (2.48) 
Latitude  0.031    0.079    0.228    0.278   
  (0.210)    (0.200)    (0.200)    (0.220)   
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  7.64***  7.96***  7.89***  8.33***  5.93***  7.41***  5.60***  6.26*** 
  (1.24)  (0.46)  (1.24)  (0.55)  (1.11)  (0.44)  (1.39)  (0.67) 
Observations  132  132  132  132  132  132  132  132 
R-squared  0.48  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.50  0.50  0.52  0.51 
Source:  Author. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 20 
The inclusion of political variables amongst the determinants of vouchers received by a district 
did not significantly alter the estimated impact of the economic variables. Across the regressions in 
columns 1 through 8 in Table 4, the coefficients on the farmers in the districts suggest that voucher 
allocation in a district increased by about 6 percent per every 10,000 farmers. This is the same estimate as 
in the economic-variables-only specification. As was the estimate when only economic variables were 
considered, each square kilometer of maize cropped increased the voucher allocation of the district by 0.3 
percent. The impact of district poverty on voucher allocation is unchanged from the economic-variables-
only specification - less-poor districts received a higher number of vouchers. The fact that the impact of 
the economic variables on the districts’ voucher allocation is not altered by the inclusion of the political 
variables indicates that correlation between economic variables and political variables does not drive the 
statistical significance of the coefficients on the political variables.  This is more evidence that political 
characteristics of districts were considered in the voucher allocation independent of any economic 
characteristics considered.   21 
6.  ISSUES THAT MAY CHALLENGE THE FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
To reach the conclusion that political considerations explain in part the pattern of allocation of vouchers 
under Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program, certain assumptions were made. We discuss the 
justification for those assumptions and explain why they are not likely to be the drivers of our main 
finding. We also consider alternative interpretations, other than political manipulation, for why the 
political characteristics of a district are predictors for its voucher allocation. 
Within our analytical framework, we make the assumption that the political goals of the ruling 
party in the presidential election are manifested in the pattern of allocations at the district level. Even 
though we discuss vouchers being transferred from the central government to the districts, the process in 
actuality includes several players who may also have their own political and other motivations (such as 
economic rents) for distributing vouchers the way they did. However, we argue that in the political 
context of Ghana, all the players in the chain through which vouchers are transferred from the 
headquarters of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Accra to the district agricultural offices, have 
incentives that are aligned with the politicians’ in the ruling party. The regional allocation is implicitly 
determined by the number of region-specific vouchers printed. It is reasonable to assume that for reasons 
such as planning and budgeting, the decision on the number and kinds of vouchers to be printed would 
have been reviewed by several top-level members of the government. Those ministers and other members 
of the ruling executive would have been able to influence the regional distribution in a way that supported 
the political interests of the party through which they had gained their offices.  
We showed that the region of location was an important predictor of the number of vouchers a 
district received. Once vouchers reached the regional agricultural offices, they were distributed among 
districts based on some discretionary criteria. Again, we argue that at this stage of distribution, any 
political manipulation would have been in line with the goals of the ruling party. The regional agricultural 
directors, who either personally or through their proxies decide the district allocation, are de facto 
political appointees of the ruling government. Any proxy for a regional agricultural director, perhaps the 
stock keeper or the disbursing financial officer at the regional level, reports either formally or informally 
to the regional agricultural director. There is therefore no incentive for the regional agricultural directors 
or their proxy to distribute vouchers in a way that would not meet with the approval of the ruling party. 
The question remains as to how the wishes of the ruling party were conveyed to the people distributing 
vouchers at the regional agricultural offices. We do not have an answer that details the mechanism but 
one can conjecture several plausible scenarios.  For instance, there could have been informal verbal 
directives and unspoken cues to those in charge of allocating vouchers to the districts.  
A challenge can be raised to our choice of the total number of vouchers a district received as a 
measure of the benefit a district received from the voucher program. For starters, the vouchers were 
fertilizer-specific and some types of vouchers may have been more valuable to farmers than others. There 
were also different cash supplements for the vouchers depending on which fertilizer was being 
purchased.
22
A related challenge may be raised to our use of the number of vouchers received by the district, 
instead of the number of vouchers actually used, as the measure of the benefit to the district. The national-
level redemption rates of about 45 percent of vouchers by the conclusion of the planting seasons
 
camouflage remarkably wide variation in regional redemption rates. For example, the redemption rate for 
NPK 15:15:15 was only 8 percent in the Western Region compared with 69 percent in the Northern 
 It is possible that the benefit that districts perceived of their allocation was not just the total 
number but the composition. We elect to focus on the total number of vouchers because it is the most 
straightforward measure—any other measure would require a space- and time-varying quantification of 
how farmers in the districts trade off price versus ease of application, versus type of fertilizer. We are 
confident that total number of vouchers is at least a good proxy for the benefit that a district received from 
the voucher program based on anecdotal evidence that farmers were glad to receive any voucher.  
                                                       
22The announced subsidized price to farmers in district capitals was GH¢ 26, GH¢ 26, GH¢ 24, and GH¢ 18 for urea, NPK 
15:15:15, NPK 23:10:05, and sulfate of ammonia, respectively.   22 
Region (Banful 2009). We argue that the varying redemption rates do not alter our conclusion that the 
political characteristics of districts played an important role in allocation of subsidy benefits for the 
following reason. It would have been a considerable coordination- and data-intensive effort for the 
government to accurately anticipate the voucher redemption rate in each district so that it could ostensibly 
show support for the district by allocating a higher number of vouchers than the subsidy benefits that they 
were actually willing to make available to residents of the district. It is possible that due to the late start of 
subsidy program, lower redemption rates may have been more likely for districts in some agroecological 
zones than in others. However, anecdotal evidence from our fieldwork suggests that fertilizer shortages of 
varying severity contributed significantly to the variation in voucher redemption rates.   With fertilizer 
distribution left to the private sector, and minimal data about the agricultural input dealer network, it is 
unlikely that the government could have known how and when product shortages could hit each district. 
Without prior knowledge of exactly how the redemption rates would differ across districts, it was not 
possible for the government to anticipate the number of fertilizer vouchers transferred to district that 
would actually be used.  The total number of vouchers transferred to the district still remains the better 
measure of how much subsidy benefits the government sought to transfer to the district. It was a 
reasonable assumption for the government, as we have assumed, that the more vouchers a district got, the 
more subsidy benefits it residents would receive.   
Political manipulation of a transfer program can take many forms, and other dimensions of 
manipulation exist that we have not considered. In our analysis, we have not broached the timing of the 
release of vouchers to the district during the subsidy program. It is known that districts did not receive 
their voucher allocation in one bulk disbursement but on several dates during the subsidy program. 
Fertilizer application is time sensitive, and a district that received a higher number of vouchers toward the 
end of the planting season may have been less well off than a district that received a lower number of 
vouchers but earlier in the planting season. We do not have an accurate record of when districts received 
their voucher allocation, and so do not consider this in our analysis.  
We make the implicit assumption that the number of vouchers available for farmers resident in a 
district is no more than what was allocated to the district. Our results would be corrupted if in fact the 
government made allocations to the districts expecting that vouchers allocated to one district could be 
distributed to residents of another district. That concern is allayed due to the subsidy design, which called 
for extension agents to distribute vouchers only to farmers within their operational area. Farmers from 
within the district, in whose interest it was to guard their district allocation fiercely, policed who got a 
voucher, and it is not likely that there was significant leakage of voucher allocation from one district to 
another. Furthermore, since any leakage was not explicitly anticipated, the total voucher allocation to the 
district still remains a measure of the benefits the ruling party sought to make available there.  
It can be argued that our main finding—that vouchers were used for vote-buying and targeted to 
opposition districts—can be explained by other factors based on efficiency considerations. We find this 
argument highly unlikely.  Such efficiency considerations would first have had to be omitted from the 
economic variables we control for, and second, would have to be perfectly correlated with the vote 
margin in districts. It is hard to think of any economic efficiency variable that has both of these properties. 
The estimates on the economic efficiency variables that we did include, such as the number of farmers, 
the district poverty, and the area of food cropped, were all robust to the inclusion of political variables. It 
is unlikely then that any other omitted economic variables are perfectly correlated to the political 
variables of interest.  
One could argue that even though the political characteristics of a district are determinants of its 
voucher allocation, that does not suggest that the ruling party systematically influenced voucher 
allocations. Perhaps the political manipulation was at the district level, where members of Parliament or 
other politically influential people at the district independently lobbied for higher voucher allocation. The 
observed allocation pattern could result if lobbying for vouchers were more aggressively pursued or more 
successful in districts where the ruling government had lost by a higher margin. This scenario is unlikely 
as it is in the interest of all incumbent politicians to lobby for benefits for their constituents, especially in 
an election year. There is no a priori reason to expect that members of Parliament in opposition districts 23 
lobbied more strongly than members of Parliament affiliated with the ruling government. If lobbying was 
the way in which voucher allocation was determined, it would be more likely for members of the ruling 
government party to be able to extract more generous voucher allocations from the government instead of 
the pattern observed. Our interpretation that the political manipulation was orchestrated from the ruling 
party at the center fits the data and is a more likely scenario. 
   24 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are just some of the countries in SSA that have 
returned to large-scale government interventions to promote fertilizer use following a period of 
liberalization and government exit from the fertilizer sector. This is despite experience from the recent 
past in which fertilizer subsidy programs were inefficient and placed unsustainably high fiscal burdens on 
governments. Many of the past programs also suffered compounding inefficiencies caused by distribution 
of subsidy benefits based on political instead of economic and welfare considerations. 
The new paradigm of fertilizer subsidies emphasizes the need for benefits to be targeted to poor 
smallholders through the use of such mechanisms as vouchers and for subsidy programs to bolster private 
markets through public–private partnerships in their implementation. These innovations have emboldened 
the increasing acceptance of fertilizer subsidies as a necessary tool to increase agricultural productivity in 
SSA. Although such innovations address some of the sources of inefficiency of past subsidy programs, 
they do not address how to prevent political manipulation of subsidy benefits as was typical in past 
programs.  
In this paper, we employ a unique dataset that provides information about how vouchers, entitling 
residents to the program benefits, were allocated across districts in Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy 
program. The subsidy program incorporated several of the innovations in fertilizer subsidy 
implementation.  
We combine district-level data on vouchers received with election data to determine how the 
political characteristics of districts affected their voucher allocations. In our empirical analysis, the 
political characteristics of the districts are captured by variables of relevance in both the “swing voter” 
and “core supporter” models. We find that political characteristics of the districts are a statistically 
significant determinant of the number of vouchers received controlling for agroecology and district 
demographics. However, we do not find that vouchers are targeted to the government supporters as has 
been the case in some other programs. Rather we find that vouchers are used in an attempt at vote-buying. 
Higher numbers of vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling party had lost in the previous 
presidential elections, and more so in the districts that had been lost by a higher margin. A district 
received 2 percent more vouchers for each percentage point by which the ruling party had lost the district. 
This amount is both statistically and numerically significant; a district at the average loss margin for the 
ruling government received 66 percent more vouchers than a similar district that the ruling government 
had won. The analysis also shows that contrary to what one would expect under a purely efficiency-based 
allocation, poorer districts received relatively fewer vouchers.  
This evidence suggests that despite innovations in the design and implementation of fertilizer 
subsidies, political capture, a major source of inefficiency of subsidy programs of the past, remains 
unresolved. Until viable innovations emerge that prevent political manipulation, the new subsidy 
programs have the potential to experience at least some of the significant pitfalls of subsidy programs 
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